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Abstract. Recently, we proposed a new method called the plausibil-
ity transformation method to convert a belief function model to an
equivalent probability model. In this paper, we compare the plausibil-
ity transformation method with the pignistic transformation method.
The two transformation methods yield qualitatively different probabil-
ity models. We argue that the plausibility transformation method is the
correct method for translating a belief function model to an equivalent
probability model that maintains belief function semantics.
1 Introduction
Bayesian probability theory and the Dempster-Shafer (D-S) theory of belief func-
tions are two distinct calculi for modeling and reasoning with knowledge about
propositions in uncertain domains. In a recent paper [1], we have argued that
these two calculi have roughly the same expressive power. Also, in [2, 3], we
have proposed a new method, called the plausibility transformation method, for
transforming a belief function model to an equivalent probability model.
In this paper, we compare the two techniques—the pignistic transforma-
tion [11] and the plausibility transformation—for transforming a belief func-
tion model to a Bayesian probability model. In many cases, these two methods
lead to radically different probability models starting from the same belief func-
tion model. We argue that the plausibility transformation method is the correct
method and that it provides an equivalent probability model that is consistent
with belief function semantics.
There are many different semantics of belief functions, including multivalued
mapping [5], random codes [9], transferable beliefs [11], and hints [7], that are
compatible with Dempster’s rule of combination. However, the semantics of belief
functions as upper and lower probability bounds on some true but unknown
probability function are incompatible with Dempster’s rule [12]. In this paper,
we are concerned with the D-S theory of belief functions with Dempster’s rule
of combination as the updating rule, and not with theories of upper and lower
probabilities that admit various other rules for updating beliefs. One benefit of
studying probability functions derived from D-S belief functions is a more clear
understanding of D-S belief function semantics.
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains nota-
tion and definitions associated with probability theory and the Dempster–Shafer
theory of belief functions. Section 3 defines the pignistic and plausibility trans-
formation methods. Section 4 describes three examples that are studied in great
detail. Section 5 contains four theorems that define the properties of the plau-
sibility transformation. In Section 6, we summarize and conclude. Proofs of all
theorems can be found in [2]. This paper is extracted from a larger unpublished
working paper [2].
2 Notation and Definitions
This section establishes notation and definitions that will be used throughout
the paper.
2.1 Probability Theory
A probability potential Ps for s is a function Ps : Ωs → [0, 1]. We express
our knowledge by probability potentials, which are combined to form the joint
probability distribution, which is then marginalized to the relevant variables.
Projection of States. If (w, x, y, z) is a state of {W,X,Y,Z}, for example,
then the projection of (w, x, y, z) to {W,X} is simply (w, x), which is a state of
{W,X}. If s and t are sets of variables, s ⊆ t, and x is a state of t, then x↓s
denotes the projection of x to s.
Combination. Combination in probability theory is “pointwise” multiplication
of potentials followed by normalization. Suppose Ps is a probability potential for
s and Pt is a probability potential for t. Then Ps ⊗ Pt is a probability potential
for s ∪ t defined as follows:
(Ps ⊗ Pt)(x) = K−1Ps(x↓s)Pt(x↓t), (1)
for each x ∈ Ωs∪t, where K =
∑
{Ps(x↓s)Pt(x↓t) | x ∈ Ωs∪t} is the normaliza-
tion constant.
Marginalization. Marginalization in probability theory involves addition over
the state space of the variables being eliminated. Suppose Ps is a probability
potential for s, and suppose X ∈ s. The marginal of Ps for s \ {X}, denoted by
P
↓(s\{X})
s , is the probability potential for s \ {X} defined as follows:
P ↓(s\{X})s (y) =
∑
{Ps(y, x) | x ∈ ΩX}, (2)
for all y ∈ Ωs\{X}.
2.2 Dempster-Shafer Theory of Belief Functions
A Dempster-Shafer basic probability assignment (bpa) assigns values to subsets
of the state space. If Ωs is the state space of a set of variables s, a function
m : 2Ωs → [0, 1] is a bpa for s whenever m(∅) = 0 and
∑
{m(a) | a ∈ 2Ωs} = 1. (3)
A bpa can also be stated in terms of a corresponding plausibility function.
The plausibility function P lm corresponding to a bpa m for s is defined as
P lm : 2Ωs → [0, 1] such that for all a ∈ 2Ωs ,
Plm(a) =
∑
{m(b) | b ∩ a 6= ∅}. (4)
Projection and Extension of Subsets. If r and s are sets of variables, r ⊆ s,
and a is a nonempty subset of Ωs, then the projection of a to r, denoted by a↓r,
is the subset of Ωr given by a↓r = {x↓r | x ∈ a}.
By extension of a subset of a state space to a subset of a larger state space,
we mean a cylinder set extension. If r and s are sets of variables, r ⊂ s, and a is a
subset of Ωr, then the extension of a to s is a×Ωs\r . Let a↑s denote the extension
of a to s. For example, if a is a subset of Ω{W,X}, then a↑{W,X,Y,Z} = a×Ω{Y,Z}.
Combination. Calculation of a joint bpa is accomplished by using Dempster’s
rule of combination [5]. Consider two bpa’s mA and mB for a and b, respectively.
The combination of mA and mB , denoted by mA⊕mB , is the bpa for a∪ b given
by
(mA ⊕mB)(c) = K−1
∑
{mA(x)mB(y) | (x↑(a∪b)) ∩ (y↑(a∪b) = c} (5)
for all nonempty c ⊆ Ωa∪b, where K is a normalization constant given by K =∑
{mA(x)mB(y) | (x↑(a∪b)) ∩ (y↑(a∪b) 6= ∅}.
Marginalization. Suppose m is a bpa for s, and suppose t ⊂ s. The marginal
of m for t, denoted m↓t, is the bpa for t defined as follows:
m↓t(a) =
∑
{m(b) | b↓t = a} (6)
for each a ⊂ Ωt.
3 Transformation Methods
In this section, we define the pignistic transformation and the plausibility trans-
formation methods for converting belief functions to probability functions.
3.1 Pignistic Transformation.
Suppose m is a bpa for s. Let BetPm denote the corresponding probability









for each x ∈ Ωs. To simplify terminology, we will refer to the BetPm as a pignistic
probability function (corresponding to bpa m).
3.2 Plausibility Transformation.
Suppose m is a bpa for s. Let Plm denote the plausibility function for s cor-
responding to bpa m. Let Pl Pm denote the probability function for s corre-
sponding to m obtained using the plausibility transformation method. P l Pm is
defined as follows:
Pl Pm(x) = K−1P lm({x}) (8)
for all x ∈ Ωs, where K =
∑
{P lm({x}) | x ∈ Ωs} is the normalization constant.
To simplify terminology, we will refer to P l Pm as the plausibility probability
function (corresponding to bpa m).
4 Three Examples
The examples in this section will highlight the differences between the pignistic
and plausibility transformation methods.
4.1 Example 1: Peter, Paul, and Mary [11].
A mafia don, the Godfather, has three assassins, Peter, Paul, and Mary. Needing
to assassinate an informant, Mr. Jones, the Godfather decides to first toss a fair
coin to decide the sex of the assassin. If the toss results in heads, he will pick
Mary for the job. If the toss results in tails, he will ask either Peter or Paul to
do the job. In the case of tails, we have no knowledge of how the Godfather will
select between Peter and Paul. Now suppose we find Mr. Jones assassinated.
An informant in the mafia organization has informed the district attorney (DA)
about the Godfather’s incomplete mechanism for choosing among Peter, Paul,
and Mary. The DA would like to indict Peter, Paul, or Mary (in addition to the
Godfather). Who should the DA indict?
Let A denote the assassin variable with three states: Peter, Paul, and Mary.
Given our knowledge of the incomplete protocol of how the assassin was se-
lected, we can represent it by the bpa m1 for A as follows: m1({Mary}) = 0.5,
m1({Peter, Paul}) = 0.5. The pignistic probability function corresponding to
m1 is as follows: BetPm1(Mary) = 0.5, BetPm1(Peter) = BetPm1(Paul) =
0.25. The plausibility probability function corresponding to m1 is as follows:
P l Pm1(Mary) = P l Pm1(Peter) = P l Pm1(Paul) = 1/3. The pignistic trans-
formation completes the Godfather’s incomplete selection protocol by dividing
the 0.5 probability equally between Peter and Paul. We refer to this assignment
of equal probabilities as a random choice protocol. The plausibility transforma-
tion makes no assumption about the mechanism that will be used. The mafia
don may always prefer Peter to Paul, or perhaps Paul to Peter. Using standard
belief function semantics, there is a 0.5 chance that Mary is not the assassin, a
0.5 chance that Peter is not the assassin, and a 0.5 chance that Paul is not the
assassin. This explains the plausibility probability function P l Pm1 .
Clearly, the two transformation methods yield qualitatively different results
starting from the same bpa m1. Which probability distribution can be considered
as equivalent to m1? In the following paragraphs, we describe one argument
(flawed, in our opinion) in favor of the pignistic transformation method and two
arguments (compelling, in our opinion) in favor of the plausibility transformation
method.
Consider the following argument in favor of the pignistic transformation
method1.
There is exactly one “argument” for Mary and one “counter-argument”
each for Mary, Peter and Paul, respectively, as follows [6]:
Arguments Counter-arguments Bel Pl
Mary Heads Tails ⇒ 0.5 0.5
Peter – Heads ⇒ 0 0.5
Paul – Heads ⇒ 0 0.5
A transformation method should take both arguments and counter-
arguments into account. The pignistic transformation method considers
both in this example by averaging the weights of arguments and counter-
arguments. On the other hand, the plausibility transformation method
takes only counter-arguments into account (ignoring arguments).
What this argument fails to notice is that the counter-arguments for Peter and
Paul are exactly the same as the argument for Mary. Thus, in averaging the
weights of arguments and counter-arguments, we are selectively double-counting
information, violating a fundamental tenet of uncertain reasoning. A belief func-
tion has exactly the same information as the corresponding plausibility function,
P l(a) = 1−Bel(ΩA \ a). By ignoring arguments, the plausibility transformation
method avoids double counting uncertain information.
One way to resolve the conflict between BetP and Pl P is to appeal to the
property of idempotency. Suppose we have two pieces of identical, independent
1 This argument was provided by Rolf Haenni [private communication].
evidence about the assassin, both equal to the bpa m1. If we use Dempster’s rule
to combine these two pieces of evidence, we observe that m1 ⊕ m1 = m1, i.e.,
m1 is idempotent. P l Pm1 is also idempotent, i.e., Pl Pm1 ⊗ Pl Pm1 = Pl Pm1 .
However, notice that BetPm1 is not idempotent. Denoting BetPm1 ⊗BetPm1 by
BetPm, we have BetPm(Mary) = 2/3 and BetPm(Peter) = BetPm(Paul) =
1/6. Idempotency is an important qualitative property of uncertain knowledge
because double-counting of idempotent information is harmless.
Continuing the Peter, Paul or Mary saga, suppose we subsequently learn
that Peter has a cast-iron alibi during the time Mr. Jones was assassinated.
This piece of evidence can be represented by the bpa m2 for A as follows:
m2({Paul,Mary}) = 1. If we combine the two independent bpa’s m1 and m2,
we get (m1⊕m2)({Paul}) = (m1⊕m2)({Mary}) = 0.5. Since the joint bpa has
only singleton focal subsets, both the pignistic and plausibility probability func-
tions corresponding to m1⊕m2 agree: BetPm1⊕m2(Paul) = Pl Pm1⊕m2(Paul) =
BetPm1⊕m2(Mary) = Pl Pm1⊕m2(Mary) = 0.5. However, if we were using the
pignistic probability distribution BetPm1 , and we update this probability distri-
bution (using Bayes rule) with the evidence of Peter’s alibi (represented with a
likelihood vector that has 0 for Peter and 1’s for Paul and Mary), we end with
a probability distribution for A that has probability 2/3 for Mary and 1/3 for
Paul, a result that does not coincide with BetPm1⊕m2 . On the other hand, if
we were using the plausibility probability distribution Pl Pm1 , and we update
this distribution with the evidence of Peter’s alibi, the result is a probability
distribution for A that has probability 1/2 for Paul and 1/2 for Mary, exactly
the same probability distribution as Pl Pm1⊕m2 .
4.2 Example 2: Counter-Example [10].
Consider a bpa m for a variable H with state space ΩH = {h1, . . . , h70} as
follows: m({h1}) = 0.30, m({h2}) = 0.01, m({h2, h3, . . . , h70}) = 0.69. For this
bpa m, the pignistic probability function BetPm is as follows: BetPm(h1) =
0.30, BetPm(h2) = 0.02, BetPm(h3) = . . . = BetPm(h70) = 0.01. The un-
normalized plausibility probability function P l P ′m is as follows: P l P
′
m(h1) =
0.30, Pl P ′m(h2) = 0.70, Pl P
′
m(h3) = . . . = P l P
′
m(h70) = 0.69.
Clearly, the two probability functions are very different. The pignistic prob-
ability function has h1 15 times more likely than h2 whereas the plausibility
probability function has h2 2.33 times more likely than h1. Our interpretation
is that the pignistic transformation uses a random protocol where the probabil-
ity of 0.69 is divided equally amongst the 69 states h2,. . .,h70. Smets [?] argues
that the originality of Shafer’s model is that—unlike probabilistic models—it
does not resort to an argument of symmetry to arbitrarily split belief assigned
to non-singleton subsets into equal parts; however, we interpret the pignistic
transformation as performing this very allocation.
Shafer [8] states that m(A) should be interpreted as the probability mass
that is “confined to A but can move freely to every point of A” (p. 40). In this
example, we have belief of 0.70 against h1, a belief of 0.30 against h2, and a
belief of 0.31 against h3,. . .,h70. Rather than use a random choice protocol, the
plausibility transformation assumes that all mass can move freely to any state in
the focal element of the belief function, which is consistent with belief function
semantics.
Another compelling argument for the plausibility transformation method is
as follows. Consider an hypothetical situation where we have n independent
pieces of evidence, all exactly equal to m. Combining these n pieces of evidence
by Dempster’s rule yields mn. For n ≥ 500, we observe that mn({h2}) ≈ 1, so
the result is more consistent with P l Pm (that has h2 as the most probable state)
than with BetPm (that has h1 as the most probable state). Notice that if we
combine Pl Pm n times using Bayes rule (or pointwise multiplication) and denote
the result by (Pl Pm)n, for large n we get the result that (Pl Pm)n(h2) ≈ 1.
4.3 Example 3: Target Identification Problem [4].
A target identification system is composed of 30 sensors, Si, i = 1, . . . , 30. Each
sensor Si is in one of two states xi or yi. The state of the sensors depends on an
unknown target that is assumed to be in one of two states: t1 denoting friend, or
t2 denoting foe. The state of each sensor also depends on whether it is working
or not. When in working condition, a sensor reading of xi correctly identifies
a target of type t1 and a sensor reading of yi correctly identifies a target of
type t2. When the sensors are not in working condition, nothing is known about
what the sensor readings mean. The first 11 sensors S1,. . .,S11 are high quality
sensors, and the remaining 19 sensors S12,. . . ,S30 are low quality sensors. A high
quality sensor has a 99% probability of being in working condition whereas a low
quality sensor has only a 90% probability of being in working condition. Data in
the form of sensor readings is collected as follows: x1,. . .,x10,y11,x12,y13,. . .,y30.
What conclusions can we draw about the actual target type?
First, we will represent the evidence from the 30 sensors by bpa’s and compute
the joint belief function for T . Subsequently, we will represent the evidence
by probability functions using the pignistic transformation and the plausibility
transformation, in each case computing the joint probability function for T .
Table 1. Bpa Encoding of Sensor Readings
Sensor Si = xi Sensor S11 = y11 Sensor S12 = x12 Sensor Si = yi
i = 1, . . . , 10 i = 13, . . . , 30
a ⊆ 2ΩT mi(a) a ⊆ 2ΩT m11(a) a ⊆ 2ΩT m12(a) a ⊆ 2ΩT mi(a)
{t1} 0.99 {t2} 0.99 {t1} 0.90 {t2} 0.90
{t1, t2} 0.01 {t1, t2} 0.01 {t1, t2} 0.10 {t1, t2} 0.10
Table 1 shows the data collected from the sensors represented as evidence in
bpa’s. We can reach a conclusion about the target identity by calculating the
joint bpa for the 30 sensors. Using Dempster’s rule, the joint bpa m is given by
m = m1⊕ . . .⊕m30. The results are presented in Table 2. Thus, as per the belief
function model, the target is approximately 10 times more likely to be a friend
than a foe.
Next, we will model this problem using probabilities from pignistic trans-
formations of the 30 belief functions. The probability functions are shown in
Table 3. The results of combining the 30 probability functions using pointwise
multiplication and normalizing the resulting probability function are presented
in Table 4.
Table 2. Joint Bpa and Plausibility Functions for 30 Sensors
a ∈ 2ΩT Un-normalized bpa Normalized bpa (m) Plausibility (P lm)
∅ ≈ 1 0 0
{t1} ≈ 1.00× 10−20 0.9091 0.9091
{t2} ≈ 1.00× 10−21 0.0909 0.0909
{t1, t2} ≈ 1.00× 10−41 0.0000 1
Table 3. Pignistic Probability Function Encoding of Sensor Readings
Sensor Si = xi Sensor S11 = y11 Sensor S12 = x12 Sensor Si = yi
i = 1, . . . , 10 i = 13, . . . , 30
x∈ΩT BetPmi(x) x∈ΩT BetPm11 (x) x∈ΩT BetPm12 (x) x∈ΩT BetPmi(x)
t1 0.995 t1 0.005 t1 0.95 t1 0.05
t2 0.005 t2 0.995 t2 0.05 t2 0.95
Table 4. The Joint Pignistic Probability Model for the Target Identification Problem
x ∈ ΩT Un-normalized Probability Normalized Probability
t1 ≈ 1.723E − 26 ≈ 0.0820
t2 ≈ 1.930E − 25 ≈ 0.9180
Sum ≈ 2.102E − 25 1
Notice that the pignistic probability model of the target identification prob-
lem is qualitatively different from the belief function model. As per the pignistic
probability model, the probability that the target is a foe is approximately 11
times more likely than the probability that the target is a friend. In general,
if m1 and m2 are two bpa’s on the same domain, then (BetPm1 ⊗ BetPm2) 6=
BetPm1⊕m2 .
Next, consider the probability model for the target identification problem
obtained from the belief function model using the plausibility transformation.
This model is shown in Table 5. If we combine the 30 plausibility probability
functions using pointwise multiplication and normalize the resulting probability
function, we obtain the results in Table 6.
Table 5. Plausibility Probability Function Encoding of Sensor Readings
Sensor Si = xi Sensor S11 = y11 Sensor S12 = x12 Sensor Si = yi
i = 1, . . . , 10 i = 13, . . . , 30
x∈ΩT P l Pmi(x) x∈ΩT P l Pm11 (x) x∈ΩT P l Pm12 (x) x∈ΩT P l Pmi(x)
t1 0.9901 t1 0.0099 t1 0.9091 t1 0.0909
t2 0.0099 t2 0.9901 t2 0.0909 t2 0.9091
Table 6. The Joint Plausibility Probability Model
x ∈ ΩT Un-normalized Probability Normalized Probability
t1 ≈ 1.4656E − 21 ≈ 0.9091
t2 ≈ 1.4656E − 22 ≈ 0.0909
Sum ≈ 1.6121E − 21 1
Notice that the conclusion is similar to the result obtained in the belief func-
tion model. In the next section, we will show that this equivalence between the
belief function model conclusion and plausibility probability function is always
true.
5 Justification and Properties of the Plausibility
Transformation
In all three examples described in the previous section, there is a discrepancy
between the pignistic probability function(s) obtained before and after combin-
ing all evidence. Smets [10] resolves this apparent discrepancy of the pignistic
transformation by stating that beliefs are held at the credal level and one only
descends to the probability space for decision making at the time a decision has
to be made. However, we view decision-making as a dynamic activity.
Probability theory and belief function theory are two uncertainty calculi with
roughly the same expressive power [1]. One should get roughly the same results
regardless of the calculi one is using to represent knowledge if the models built
using the calculi are equivalent. An appropriate transformation method can allow
a model of an uncertain domain in one calculus to be translated into the other.
Thus we can exploit the advantages of both calculi.
The pignistic transformation is justified based on a so-called “rationality”
requirement, which implies a mathematical requirement of linearity. Other jus-
tifications for the pignistic transformation are given in [10, 11]. Some intuitive
justifications for the plausibility transformation are given in [2, 3]. Here we will
state four theorems that demonstrate that the plausibility transformation is con-
sistent with belief functions semantics.
Theorem 1. Suppose m1,. . .,mk are k bpa’s. Suppose Plm1 ,. . .,Plmk
are the associated plausibility functions, and suppose Pl Pm1 ,. . .,P l Pmk
are the corresponding probability functions. If m = m1 ⊕ . . . ⊕ mk is
the joint bpa, P lm is the associated plausibility function, and Pl Pm is
the corresponding plausibility probability function, then P l Pm1 ⊗ . . .⊗
P l Pmk = P l Pm.
Fig. 1. A Pictorial Depiction of Theorem 1.
Theorem 1 is depicted pictorially in Figure 1. Notice that from a computa-
tional perspective, it is much faster to compute Pl Pm1 ⊗ . . . ⊗ P l Pmk than it
is to compute Pl Pm (since the latter involves Dempster’s rule of combination
and the former involves Bayes rule).
Given bpa m, we don’t view P l Pm as an approximation of m. Instead,
we view P l Pm as an equivalent probability encoding of the information in m.
Thus if we have a belief function model consisting of {m1, . . . ,mk}, then we
view {Pl Pm1 , . . . , P l Pmk} as an equivalent probability model. Theorem 1 can
be viewed as a regularity condition for any transformation method. As demon-
strated in the Peter, Paul, and Mary, and the target identification problems, the
pignistic transformation does not satisfy this condition.
If a unique state x exists in a bpa m such that Limn→∞mn({x}) = 1 (where
mn = m ⊕ . . . ⊕m, n times), an equivalent probability function should have x
as its most probable state. This property is satisfied for the plausibility trans-
formation, as stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Consider a bpa m for s (with corresponding plausibil-
ity function P lm) such that x ∈ Ωs is the most plausible state, i.e.,
P lm({x}) > P lm({y}), for all y ∈ Ωs \ {x}. If P lm∞ denotes the
plausibility function corresponding to m∞, then Plm∞({x}) = 1, and
P lm∞({y}) = 0 for all y ∈ Ωs \ {x}.
In Example 2 presented in Section 4, m500({h2}) ≈ 1, so the most plausible
hypothesis in m is h2, consistent with P l Pm and not BetPm.
If a bpa function has a subset of most plausible states, all with equal plausi-
bility, the following theorem applies.
Theorem 3. Consider a bpa m for s (with corresponding plausibility
function Plm) such that t ⊆ Ωs is a subset of most plausible states, i.e.,
P lm({x}) = Plm({y}) for all x, y ∈ t, and Plm({x}) > P lm({z}) for all
x ∈ t, and z ∈ Ωs \t. Then there exists a partition {a1, . . . ,ak} of t such
that m∞(ai) = 1/k for i = 1, . . . , k, i.e., Plm∞(x) = Plm∞(y) = 1/k for
all x, y ∈ t, and P lm∞(z) = 0 for all z ∈ Ωs \ t.
In the Peter, Paul, and Mary saga described earlier, the initial belief function
m1 has a corresponding plausibility function where each state has equal plausi-
bilities. Theorem 3 applies with a1 = {Mary}, a2 = {Peter, Paul}, and k = 2.
The next theorem states that Pl Pm is idempotent if m is idempotent.
Theorem 4. If m is idempotent with respect to Dempster’s rule, i.e.,
m ⊕m = m, then P l Pm is idempotent with respect to Bayes rule, i.e.,
P l Pm ⊗ P l Pm = Pl Pm.
As demonstrated in the Peter, Paul, and Mary example, BetPm does not
satisfy this property.
6 Conclusions and Summary
In summary, if T transforms a bpa m in a belief function model to an equivalent
probability function T (m), T should satisfy four basic properties:
1). Invariance with respect to combination: T (m1 ⊕ . . . ⊕ mn) = T (m1) ⊗
. . . ⊗ T (mn), which is satisfied for the plausibility transformation, according to
Theorem 1;
2) Unique most plausible state: Limn→∞Tn(m)(hi) = 1 if Limn→∞mn(hi) =
1, which is satisfied for the plausibility transformation according to Theorem 2;
3) Non-unique most plausible states: If Limn→∞Plmn(x) = Limn→∞Plmn(y)
for all x, y ∈ t ⊆ Ωs and Limn→∞Plmn(z) = 0 for all z ∈ Ωs \ t, then
Limn→∞T
n(m)(x)=Limn→∞Tn(m)(y) for all x, y ∈ t, and Limn→∞Tn(m)(z) =
0 for all z ∈ Ωs \ t; this property is satisfied for the plausibility transformation
according to Theorem 3; and
4) Idempotency: T (m) is idempotent if m is idempotent, which is satisfied by
the plausibility probability transformation according to Theorem 4.
The main goal of this paper is to compare the pignistic and plausibility
transformation methods for transforming belief function models to probability
models. Until now, most of the literature on belief functions has used the pig-
nistic method. The pignistic transformation method does not satisfy the invari-
ance with respect to combination, most plausible, and idempotency axioms. On
the other hand, the plausibility transformation satisfies all intuitively accept-
able axioms we have postulated for an acceptable transformation method. We
conjecture that the plausibility transformation method is the only method that
satisfies these axioms, but we don’t have a proof of this claim.
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